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Abstract 
This article contributes to the literature on transnational environmental governance (TEG). 
Polycentricity is a popular conceptual approach in TEG, but coordination in polycentric systems 
remains largely unexplored. We put forward a conceptual model of quality standards as a productive 
links between different orders of governance in polycentric systems. Existing theories distinguish 
between regulative, institutional, and normalizing functioning of quality standards. We develop an 
integrative approach highlighting the mechanisms of coordination that rely on these three functions 
of quality standards. The case of TEG in shipping is used to illustrate how quality standards function 
not only as soft rules, but also as institutionalized references and shared conventions, enabling 
coordination across levels and scales. The paper draws attention to the limits of regulatory 
standardization, outlining how practical value can be gained from emphasizing the normative work 
associated with promulgation of quality standards.  
Keywords: transnational environmental governance, quality standards, polycentricity, coordination, 
shipping. 
 
1. Introduction  
Shipping, a critical infrastructure of global economy that carries 80% of international trade volume 
and more than 70% of its value (UNCTAD, 2017), is an inherently transboundary activity with low 
governability, particularly when it comes to environmental and safety performance (Hinds, 2003; 
Roe, 2012). It has been argued that since transboundary environmental policy problems are usually 
linked simultaneously to multiple contexts, the institutions developed within one state or one level of 
government cannot adequately address them (Christopoulos et al., 2012; Varone et al., 2013). 
Shipping illustrates this argument admirably. A closer consideration of shipping governance draws 
attention to the fact that there is no single actor, institution, or source of authority that defines and 
steers environmental quality in shipping. Instead, there is a plurality of actors and rules forming a set 
of governance arrangements within multiple interdependent contexts under the overarching set of 
maritime laws, conventions, and customs, which satisfies the criteria of a polycentric governance 
system (Roe, 2012; Bloor et al., 2014; van Leeuwen, 2015; Gritsenko, 2017). How can such a 
systemdeliver coherent outcomes, in other words, how it is coordinated across levels, in the sense of 
jurisdictions, and scales, defined here as spatio-temporal relations among levels (Sayre, 2009), 
remains poorly understood. 
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Polycentric governance refers to a type of societal organization based upon spontaneous order related 
to a common set of overarching end goals (Aligica and Tarko, 2012, p. 251). Scholars have noticed 
that in comparison to hierarchical (multi-level) or participatory (‘flat’) governance arrangements, 
polycentricity enables improved equivalence of problems and solutions as rules are scaled to impact; 
improved resilience, as functions of a unit can be taken over by an overlapping unit in case of failure; 
and improved flexibility, as the existence of multiple units enables mutual learning and provides room 
for experimentation (Huitema et al., 2009; Ostrom, 2010a, 2010b; Cole, 2011; Newig and Koontz, 
2014). While polycentric governance has been successfully used as both a positive and normative 
concept (Thiel, 2017), scholarly understanding of the operational characteristics of polycentric 
systems, their structural components and principles of functioning, is mainly focusing on empirical 
studies of resource regimes (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008; Gruby and Basurto, 2014; Pahl-Wostl and 
Kneiper, 2014; Baldwin et al., 2016). Climate governance, commonly conceptualized as a case of 
polycentric governance, has been similarly grounded in common pool resource (CPR) theorizing 
(Schlager and Heikkila, 2011; Abbott, 2012; Ostrom, 2012).  
Scholars have noticed that the absence of a single source of authority or central planning system 
increases the transaction costs and makes polycentric systems prone to coordination failures 
(Imperial, 1999; Sørensen and Torfing, 2005; McGinnis, 2005). At the same time, it has been argued 
that polycentric systems can generate rules for mutual coordination through the ongoing process of 
learning and mutual adjustment (Ostrom 2010a; Galaz et al. 2012; Koontz et al. 2015). Hence, the 
outcomes in every case are a subject to empirical scrutiny (Ostrom et al., 1961). Examples of 
successful rule-generation processes have been mainly provided in natural resource governance 
(Pahl-Wostl and Kneiper, 2014; Baldwin et al., 2016), which is both geographically situated (resource 
location) and subtractable (rivalry in consumption). Rarely the coordination process has been 
discussed in deterritorialized systems, exceptions are the works on banking (Polski, 2012; Salter and 
Tarko, 2017) and science (Polanyi, 1952; Tarko, 2014). In this article, we build on the previous 
evidence to develop an account of how complex multi-level and multi-actor systems tackle multiple 
and interdependent collective action problems beyond natural resource management. In particular, 
we pay attention to the mechanisms that align all levels of decision-making, from routine operations 
to ‘rules about rules’ (or meta-governance) in transnational environmental governance of shipping. 
This paper argues that quality standards, defined here as de jure requirements and de facto 
expectations applied to products and processes, facilitate coordination between geographically and 
organizationally diverse economic actors in maritime shipping, a domain characterized by multiple 
intra-sectoral linkages. For the purpose of this paper, we define coordination as a process of 
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organization of different actors and activities enabling them to manage interdependencies (Malone 
and Crowston, 1990). Combining the perspectives on standards from transnational business 
governance (TBG) and global value chains (GVC) literature, we re-think the extant analysis of TEG 
in shipping that focuses on organizationally-driven “orchestration” to address fragmentation of 
authority (Lister et al., 2015). We offer a standards-driven account of coordination. 
We use existing empirical studies of shipping governance to illustrate how quality standards transcend 
the “orders of governance” (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009) and coordinate the choices different actors 
make across maritime value chains. When it comes to the first level - operations – quality standards 
convey complex information and institutionalize risks, at the second – policy - level, they shape 
access to global value chains and align expectations of public and private actors, and at the level of 
meta-governance they promote images of governance and link the current state of affairs to the array 
of potential futures. The analytical model is elaborated based on an extensive review of academic 
literature in the field of maritime studies. Understanding the dynamics of quality standards in this 
polycentric system is an important step in improving the maritime governance system as a whole and 
achieving more sustainable shipping in the future. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the functioning of quality standards 
and demonstrates that the relationship between different functions remained undertheorized. Section 
3 introduces the coordination problem in polycentric governance and, combining it with the literature 
introduced in Section 2, offers a model of quality standards as a means of coordination. Section 4 
draws on existing maritime research to apply the conceptual model developed in Section 3 to the case 
of shipping, and demonstrates why quality standards are essential to polycentric shipping governance. 
Finally, Section 5 discusses the theoretical and practical implications of the conceptual model and 
concludes.  
2. Quality standards in transnational environmental governance 
From electric plugs to shoe sizes, standards are ubiquitous in our societies. They are a special type of 
rules that are not tied to hierarchical authority, seeking to convince rather than to coerce the 
addressees (Kerwer, 2005). Specific interest of this paper is in quality1 standards, defined as de jure 
(formalized) requirements and de facto (implicit) expectations pertaining to the properties and 
characteristics of products and processes that make them ‘knowable’, allowing actors to evaluate how 
                                                            
1The word “quality” has a variety of colloquial uses; in the definition of the International Standard 
Organization it is “the totality of characteristics of an entity that bear on its ability to satisfy stated and 
implied needs”(ISO 8402), that is adopted for the purpose of this paper. 
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these products and processes are positioned in the market (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005). We adopt a 
broad view on standards to emphasize the variety of jurisdictions in standard-setting and use, a crucial 
characteristic of contemporary governance. 
The phenomenon of standards and standardization has been explored in various  branches  of social 
science, including organization and business studies (Gilbert et al. 2011; Brunsson et al., 2012; 
Botzem and Dobusch, 2012; Reinicke et al., 2012), international political economy (Ponte et al. 2011; 
Marx et al., 2012; Henson and Humprey, 2012), political science (Schepel, 2005; Kerwer, 2005; 
Demortain, 2008; Abbott et al., 2015) and law (Hatto, 2001). In this literature, standards have been 
categorized along various dimensions, such as content, scope, target audience, geographical 
applicability, emergence and implementation (Table 1). One important theoretical insight of these 
typologies is the role of non-state actors, their desire and ability to engage with state-led coordination 
using standards. Thanks to their position aside from command-and-control regulation, standards are 
flexible enough to accommodate a plurality of visions within a governance system, while clarifying 
the intended relationship between different elements of the value chain (such as, environment, safety 
and production practices). 
TABLE 1 
In the context of environmental governance, quality of life and natural assets are the main targets for 
standardization (UNDP, 2002). The functioning of quality standards in transnational environmental 
governance can broadly be divided into three strands of theorizing: regulative (standards as set up 
rules), institutional (standards as collective intentions) and normalizing (standards as conventions).  
The first strand conceptualizes quality standards as an alternative to legal rules, termed also “soft 
law”, “best practice”, or “corporate social responsibility” (Kerwer, 2005; Tallontire, 2007). 
According to the scholars who study transnational business governance (TBG), action guidelines 
contained in quality standards can reduce informational asymmetry in public-private networks 
(Prakash and Potoski, 2007; Vogel, 2008) and address the problem of ‘certifying the certifiers’ 
(Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Auld, 2014). From the global value chains (GVC) perspective, 
companies often use quality standards strategically to gain competitive advantage (Christmann and 
Taylor, 2006), and that such development can be found even under authoritarian capitalism (Hofman 
et al., 2017). Their main drawback is the need for effective enforcement that may be costly or even 
not feasible in a transboundary context (Guldbrandsen, 2010). 
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The second strand pays attention to the institutional functions of quality standards, regarding them as 
collectively generated repositories of regulatory ideas (Bomhoff and Meuwese, 2011). A review of 
tools and techniques of regulatory governance in TBG provided by Eberlein et al. (2014) draws 
attention to functioning of meta-regulatory standards for standard-setting, auditing, accreditation, and 
certification. The scholars who investigated the emergence of international environmental 
management systems and quality standards, promulgated by the International Standards Association 
(ISO), discovered that the ISO 14000 after its establishment in 1996 has been effective in creating a 
common procedural language (Mendel, 2002). In other words, quality standards promote multi-
stakeholder dialogue among public, private and civil society actors involved in standard design and 
maintenance (Vogel, 1997; Abbott and Snidal, 2001; Levi-Faur, 2011). While the range of actors who 
may influence the norms in value chain governance is wide, the standards allow them to integrate 
individual regulatory strategies through broader set of quality expectations (Tallontire, 2007). At the 
same time, powerful industry alliances coming together to maintain quality control for protection of 
their reputation through establishing de jure voluntary, yet, de facto mandatory standards (Gereffi 
and Mayer, 2006), allows the ‘lead firms’ to organize international production networks in a favorable 
way (Nadvi, 2008). 
The last strand of theorizing focuses on the normalizing function of quality standards. Some GVC 
scholars integrated convention theory stemming from the French sociological tradition (Boltanski and 
Thevenot, 2006) into the study of quality standards (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005) to emphasize that 
alongside with rules rooted in collective intentions, mutual expectations that arise in the process of 
actions, called conventions, not only guide, but also legitimize actions. The normalizing function of 
quality standards allows bridging immediate (and often tacit) and broader codified knowledge by 
providing vocabularies for describing expectations and visions of desirable outcomes (Ponte et al., 
2011). These visions and associated vocabularies defining what quality is, which procedures for 
quality governance are appropriate, and who can exercise control over it, are rooted in the broader 
historical context and societal values (Busch, 2000; Barham, 2002).  
While TEG scholars engaged with standards for almost two decades, the relationship between the 
three functions of quality standards remains undertheorized. We argue that the missing link in terms 
of conceptualizing and analyzing quality standards in TEG is to acknowledge that quality standards 
have a regulative, an institutional, and a normalizing function simultaneously – yet, at different orders 
of governance, which enables coordination between multiple actors. In what follows, we combine the 
insights on quality standards presented above with a polycentric governance framework to better 
understand how standards enable coordination across levels and scales. In particular, we discuss how 
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the regulative, institutional and normalizing functions of quality standards help actors to manage 
interdependencies in polycentric shipping governance. 
 
3. Polycentric governance and quality standards 
3.1 Coordination in polycentric governance systems 
The concept of polycentricity that marks the (co-)existence of many decision-making centers within 
a common overarching framework, first appeared in social science scholarship in the mid-20th 
century (Polanyi, 1951; Ostrom et al., 1961). Table 2 summarizes the basic features of polycentricity 
in the Polanyi-Ostrom tradition. The examples of a polycentric orders include competitive public 
economies, scientific inquiry, law and adjudicatory arrangements, systems of federal governance, and 
international affairs (Polanyi, 1951; Ostrom et al., 1961; Ostrom, 1991; King, 2006). The presence of 
de facto (in addition to de jure) aspects of basic self-organization allows ascribing these cases as 
instances of polycentricity rather than anarchy. The theoretical argument in all these examples 
suggests the existence of autonomous decision-makers pursuing their goals independently of each 
other within a common overarching framework in which conflict resolution does not depend on any 
central mechanism or a reference to an external authority, but rather on a system of internal references. 
Unpacking an overarching framework of internal references is arguably a key to understanding the 
coordination mechanisms that are at work in polycentric systems. 
TABLE 2 
Following the extant literature, we make a distinction between geographically situated natural 
resource systems that govern common pool resources (CPR) characterized by subtractability and 
systems where collective action revolves around non-place based non-subtractible goods. This 
distinction is important because territoriality and substractability are associated with a variety of 
regulatory techniques not applicable for solving global environmental problems, as demonstrated in 
the literature on global public goods (for example, Kaul et al., 1999).  
In polycentric CPR governance, coordination between local user groups and between local, regional 
and national jurisdictions has been shown to be provided by establishing a system of “complementary 
backup institutions” along with local users’ associations (Baldwin et al., 2015). One feature of CPR 
systems – their territoriality – makes networking viable through tangible joint projects based on an 
interplay between individuals, international organizations and their collaboration patterns (Galaz et 
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al., 2012). The outcomes of coordination mechanisms described by Baldwin et al. (2015) and Galaz 
et al. (2012), the former leading to joint projects and rules co-evolution and the latter limited to mutual 
adjustment in multi-actor settings, are both characterized by emergence of communication networks 
that safeguard the overarching common framework, sometimes referred to as orchestration (Abbott 
and Bernstein, 2015). In sum, coordination in polycentric CPR governance is enabled by network 
forms of organization where distinction between rule-makers and rule-takers is blurred.  
In polycentric governance of non-place based goods of non-rival use, little empirical work has been 
completed to explore the characteristics of coordination. Empirical findings from studies on climate 
change adaptation demonstrated that polycentric regimes are more effective than fragmented regimes 
due to the existence of coordination among various centers and across spatial levels (Pahl-Wostl and 
Kneiper, 2014). No detailed insight into coordination mechanisms was provided by the authors. Tarko 
(2014), who explicitly focused on polycentric governance in deterritorialized settings, showed how 
informal rules and norms allowed successful coordination within a polycentric scientific community. 
After Polanyi (1962), Tarko referred to scientific standards as the key coordination mechanism. There 
exists an alignment between these standards and the incentives of individual actors, he argued, since 
scientific standards help individual scientists to promote truth-seeking. Although standards may 
change, their alignment with individual goals (“dynamic orthodoxy”) facilitates enforcement of rules 
against shrinking, and prevents backwash from competition. Hence, we hypothesize that in 
deterritorialized polycentric governance, conventions pertaining to the desirable properties and 
characteristics of the governance outcome may play a crucial role for coordination. 
3.2 Quality standards as a coordination mechanism in polycentric governance 
The previous section showed that while an overarching system of rules is a necessary condition for 
coordination in polycentric governance, these rules do not always have to be explicit, codified or 
enforced by a third party. Quality standards fit nicely into this idea of coordination in polycentric 
order as they in fact form a system of internal references. Table 3 introduces a conceptual model for 
functioning of quality standards in polycentric governance. We distinguish between three orders of 
governance (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009), in their turn, corresponding to the types of choices available 
to actors (Ostrom, 2005). The orders of governance are not temporal, spatial or scalar (local to global), 
but refer to the three basic sorts of societal governance activities which are closely related and always 
simultaneously present. Respectively, the nature of coordination varies between the orders and can 
be described as either material and regulative, or institutional and integrative, or discursive and 




First order governance is about problem solving and opportunity creation. Actors make operational 
decisions in day-to-day affairs, with a direct impact on a physical world (McGinnis and Ostrom, 
2014). These types of governance activities rely upon standards as rules that define practical choices 
among the available options pertaining to both products and processes – the regulative function of 
quality standards. In the case of products, typically standards are a set using technical characteristics 
that allow for product differentiation. Process standards govern a wider array of product attributes, 
addressing ethical behavior, risk management, social responsibility or environmental sustainability. 
Within first-order governance, standards are concrete and material, mainly written, action guidelines 
and they are a part of the policy implementation routine. Coordination has a regulative character and 
mainly targets the content of a product or process. 
Second order governance is about institutions, their design, care and maintenance and presupposes 
collective – or policy – choices. Standards here have a function of collective intentions that translate 
common framings of problems and goals into actions. Industry standards visualize the direction where 
the industry wants to go and often outline how to materialize this vision in terms of concrete actions. 
In this context, the origin of standards may have an impact on the way they are designed (orientation, 
stringency, addressee) and enforced (self-regulation, third party enforcement, hybrid approaches), 
with public and private standards operating side-by-side sometimes as complementary and sometimes 
as overlapping instruments (Henson and Humphrey, 2012). Institutional coordination brings together 
various standard-setters, so the discussion is possible both with regard to the content of specific 
standards, and with regard to the overall trend towards standardization as a form of governance.  
Finally, at the meta-level, the focus is upon formulation and application of norms and principles, or 
rules for making rules, also referred to as constitutional choices. Quality standards appear in their 
normalizing function as discourses rooted in so-called ‘governance images’, such as visions, 
knowledge, judgments, convictions, or metaphors (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009). At the same time, 
quality standards have a pronounced future orientation - they are not simply means to goals, but a 
“moving target”, a description of desirable state of affairs. They form a framework that enables public 
and private actors (second order) to design, coordinate and (successfully) exercise quality in processes 
(first order), as well as improvise and pivot if the requirements appear out-of-date or yield obsolete. 
Values, ideas and awareness that standards entail are not tied to concrete situations, but to 
fundamental social, political, and ethical questions. As a result, both de jure and de facto unwritten 
standards that come in form of conventions appear significant at the meta-level. Coordination is 
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mainly discursive in nature: standards are producing and disseminating knowledge for social learning 
and diffusion of (self)regulatory practices (Pattberg, 2005). 
In sum, standards are related to problem-solving, shared understanding and tacit knowledge in 
decision situations. This does not mean that standards are the most important element of governance 
activities at each given level, but that they are the element that the three orders have in common. Any 
given practical standard applied at the first order of governance is inherently linked to the value-laden 
images of the meta-level through the plurality of legitimate evaluation criteria institutionalised at the 
second order. At each order of governance, quality standards have a different function essential to 
maintenance of the polycentric order.  
In what follows, we extend the argument for quality standards as a coordination mechanism in 
polycentric governance outlined above to the case of shipping. We distinguish between quality 
shipping as (i) a set of technical and social parameters, (ii) a goal for governance efforts formulated 
in public and private programs, and (iii) an aspiration for safe, secure, environmentally sound, 
efficient and sustainable shipping, related to the three orders of governance, respectively. We argue 
that in addition to performing their functions within each order of governance, quality standards 
enable coordination between socio-technical innovation (progress in shipping technology and 
practice), policy and institutional response (rules regulating the adoption and use of socio-technical 
innovation), and value and knowledge systems (embeddedness of policies and institutions in the 
dominant social and normative structures). Bringing the three orders of governance into an 
interaction, quality standards help actors to manage their interdependencies within the maritime value 
chains by enabling access to and transfer of often tacit information across levels and scales. 
 
4. Environmental quality standards in polycentric shipping governance 
Shipping complies with the classical definition of polycentric systems, as it is characterized by 
multiple governing authorities at different levels, overlapping authority, and an overarching 
framework of the international legal agreements. The high level of risk associated with maritime 
causalities, as well as rising awareness of negative environmental and health impacts of shipping has 
motivated policymakers to tighten environmental and safety regulation of maritime activities. Yet, 
the hierarchically organized regulatory system based on subordination of levels of authority vested in 
national jurisdictions has been acknowledged as inappropriate to cope with the reality of shipping as 
a globalized industry with transboundary adverse effects (Roe, 2012). Scholars have also emphasized 
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variation in the ability and willingness of actors in charge of enforcing public regulations as a part of 
shipping environmental governability problem (Alderton and Wichester 2002; Bloor and Sampson 
2007; De Sombre, 2007; Corbett et al. 2007). The last two decades witnessed the proliferation of 
transnational private governance in shipping, including labeling schemes, voluntary certification, and 
corporate social responsibility, aimed at improving shipping externalities (Wuisan et al., 2012; 
Yliskylä-Peuralahti and Gritsenko, 2014; Lister et al., 2016; Poulsen et al., 2016; Change and Danao, 
2017; Poulsen et al., 2018a, Poulsen et al., 2018b). The question of coordination, or what creates 
coherence among these multiple arrangements across jurisdictions and different levels of decision-
making, remains unaddressed.  
While shipping has largely developed in the absence of command-and-control regulation, it has an 
extensive track record of quality standardization. Standards proliferated after the institutionalization 
of private shipping governance through classification societies in the early 19th century, a system still 
in place today (Hormann, 2006; Lagoni, 2007). A unique combination of private governance, 
customary law and professional values provide a fruitful case for scrutinizing the functioning of 
quality standards in polycentric shipping governance. 
4.1 First order governance: Coordinating socio-technical quality management units 
At the first order of governance, quality standards provide technical and operational specifications 
that guide actions in a direct and applied manner. Technical standards usually apply to vessels and 
their equipment, crewing, operation and maintenance, non-technical standards address managerial 
procedures and interactions with customers and broader stakeholders. The content of quality 
standards in shipping is diverse. Standards help meeting statutory and regulatory requirements with 
regard to health, safety, security and the environment, as well as ensure that customers’ needs from 
the point of view of quality of services are satisfied.  Among the most widely used are ISO 9001 
(quality management) and ISO 14000 (environmental management) series (Karahalios, 2015), but 
there are also more specialized schemes pertaining to a certain aspect, such as voluntary certifications 
schemes (Wuisan et al., 2012) and environmental CSR commitments (Yliskylä-Peuralahti et al., 
2015) addressing pollution from ships. 
Since there is usually more than one technical solution available for a problem, different technical 
fixes may compete with, complement and/or substitute for each other. For example, classification 
societies Lloyd’s Register, RINA, CCS and DNV GL have developed environmental and climate 
classification rules. According to RINA’s rules, a ship can obtain two different Green passports: 
RINA Green Plus certifies compliance with MARPOL 73/78, whereas RINA Green Star contains 
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additional measures. LR’s ECO notation requires a ship to go beyond MARPOL 73/78 requirements. 
CCS established three environmental classes: SEEMP I that includes only current MARPOL 
regulations, SEEMP II that extends to energy efficiency system, and SEEMP III that must have real 
time monitoring. DNV GL gives CLEAN notation for vessels in compliance with MARPOL 73/78 
and CLEAN DESIGN for those complying with additional measures. Thus, besides monitoring 
mandatory requirements stemming from MARPOL 73/78, ‘green notation’ developed by 
classification societies goes beyond mandatory public regulation and can be compared to voluntary 
measures, such as Clean Shipping Index or environmental CSR.  
Operations and best practices vary significantly depending on the sector. For a ship traversing the 
Northwest Passage,  requirements include a ship of a particular design, a set of navigational 
equipment and specially trained crew familiar with ice navigation, while a tanker operating in the 
Mediterranean Sea would need a different design and a different set of skills, including navigation in 
densely navigated waters, to maintain quality operations. As a result, there is a multiplicity of 
technical and managerial choices – and no one single combination that yields maximum efficiency, 
safety and environmental protection. In this situation, quality standards have been acknowledged as 
a key mechanism to find the right combination of technical, operational and managerial choices 
(Karahalios, 2015). Environmental quality standards allow for coordinating the diversity of socio-
technical quality management units, meaning people and technologies they operate, are situation-
specific and locally sensitive, yet oriented towards the same result. 
4.2 Second order governance: Quality shipping as a policy instrument 
At the second order of governance, quality standards allow translating ideas into practice when 
standardization becomes a new institution crossing the public/private divide. Standardization allows 
policy coordination between multiple centers of authority and binding together different sources of 
power (Vogel, 1997). The colossal number of actors involved in shipping governance has often been 
regarded as a challenge to governability (DeSombre, 2006; Lister et al., 2015). Although nation states 
in their three legal roles (flag, port, and coastal) remain important in terms of maritime governance, 
a plethora of actors beyond and beneath the states cannot be ignored as their relative power2 and their 
practical engagement into quality shipping is considerable. The principle of “freedom of the seas” 
that (almost solely) governed shipping for centuries has been supplemented by an inherently 
contradicting principle of “level-playing-field” (regulated competition) with the establishment of the 
                                                            




International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 1949 (Gritsenko, 2017). The proliferation of new 
actors in shipping governance, including NGOs, media, politicians, a wider general public – recently 
all fueled by social media – has increased the organizational complexity and sharpened the mismatch 
between the maritime state-centric institutional framework and globalization process in business and 
society more generally (Roe, 2012). While Lister et al. (2015) emphasized the role of the IMO in 
orchestrating the plurality of actors, we draw attention to quality standards as an integrative 
mechanism that makes coordination possible.  
The fragmentation of authority and underlying collective action problems are well exemplified in the 
case of quality assurance in tanker shipping (Håvold, 2010; Hassler, 2011; Gritsenko, 2015). In 
addition to a multi-level system of global (e.g., IMO rules and MARPOL 73/78 Convention), regional 
(e.g., Helsinki Convention or US Oil Pollution Act) and local (e.g., port-specific norms, e.g. 
concerning draught or ice class) regulations for tanker quality standards, there are a number of quality 
inspections (classification, insurance vetting, port inspection), performed essentially at the same 
governance level, but by different authorities. Eventually, rules that emerged within the oil industry 
have an impact on practices within the maritime transport industry and vice versa. Further examples  
derived from recent studies show  that among other actors ports and cargo owners have become more 
visible in the governance process as they acquired responsibilities as environmental and energy 
managers and their authority shifted by proliferation of these new activities (Gritsenko and Yliskylä-
Peuralahti, 2013; Lai et al., 2013; Acciaro et al., 2014; Wang and Notteboom, 2015). Empirical 
studies on the role of new actors emphasize that the governance of quality in shipping is not a neatly 
organized process as the analysis of formal institutional structure may suggest. Rather, standards 
function as a productive link between the IMO and other shipping regulators, such as classification 
societies, insurance companies, and industry associations, and actors involved in shipping activities, 
in particular shippers, ship owners and operators. 
Another task that quality standards perform at the second level of governance is coordinating public 
and private authority to which reduction of air emissions from shipping provides a good illustration 
(see, e.g., Gritsenko and Yliskylä-Peuralahti, 2013; Acciaro, 2014; Cullinane and Bergqvist, 2014). 
The IMO introduced additions to MARPOL Annex VI in 2006, and as a consequence several areas 
of the world ocean were designated as emission control areas (ECAs) with special emission caps as 
well as offered the concepts for energy efficient design. While these rules are mandatory, this is not 
the case for all seas and all ships. At the same time, the environmental notation explained in Section 
4.1 has been introduced by the leading certification societies, while private certification schemes 
unrolled their own rules for auditing ships that reduced their air emissions. While these are optional, 
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they can be seen as supportive of the IMO’s regulatory effort, giving it a world-wide reach softened 
by voluntary adoption.  
 
4.3 Third order governance: Quality standards as a convention 
At the third order of governance, quality standards function as ‘images’ of governance which are 
neither tangible (material) nor fixed. Quality shipping can  be conceptualized as an idea (Shinohara, 
2005), perception (Wankhade and Dabade, 2010), or convention (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005), shaped 
by multiple actors, including ship owners, classification societies, port authorities, cargo owners, 
charterers, insurers, and seafarers effectively operating the vessels, as well as bureaucrats, politicians, 
interest groups and environmental advocacies. All of them have their own ideas of how safety and 
environmental issues in global shipping are to be addressed (Haralambides, 1998). The pursuit of 
quality in shipping depends on the ability of all these actors to develop a common language. 
Standardization through concepts opens up strategies for broader stakeholders – including scientists 
and non-governmental organizations – to engage into a conversation on what quality shipping should 
be (Demortain, 2008). Even the ISO concerned with development of operational standards underlines 
the importance of standardization as a vehicle to develop terminology that provides a basis for 
effective coordination between different agencies and cultures who need to work together, for 
example, in situations of emergency response to maritime pollution (ISO, 2000). 
Since all seafarers are concerned with their own safety (Vandeskog, 2015) and shipping companies, 
national regulators, unions and larger shippers realise that safety is a cornerstone of industry’s 
sustainability, “safety culture” is among the dominant discourses in shipping. Research has attempted 
to analyze how the general rules codified in laws and formal structures transform into operational 
instructions by introducing a category of “risk perception” (see e.g., Bailey, 2006; Bhattacharya, 
2012; Kristiansen, 2013). The thesis about the “human element” as a core cause of most maritime 
accidents has been widely advocated (Rothblum, 2000; Hetherington, Flin and Mearns, 2006; Celik 
and Cebi, 2009). The recent literature has also stressed that the cultural aspect (in particular, seafarer 
training, work culture and risk perceptions) is potentially the biggest challenge in achieving 
comprehensive quality shipping (Shinohara, 2005; Zhao and Amante, 2005; Håvold, 2007; Theotokas 
and Progoulaki, 2007).  
At the same time, greater formalization of safety management in shipping has been shown to lead to 
negative sentiments among the seafarers (Vandeskog, 2015) and marginalization of local and system-
specific safety knowledge (Almklov et al., 2014). At the same time, the Rule of Good Seamanship, a 
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unique convention central to navigation practice, retains its importance for seafarers as a description 
of desirable behavior (Knudsen, 2009; Manuel, 2011). It truly shall be followed ‘in the spirit rather 
than in the letter’, since it has never been codified, but belongs to the customary maritime law and 
implies styles of action that have been rewarded historically. Nevertheless, Good Seamanship has 
been invoked in court cases at the maritime tribunal (McKinnon, 2009; Fujiwara et al., 2017). The 
Rule allows a departure from the codified rules of navigation if that is necessary to avoid collision or 
any other immediate danger. It does not enlist the qualities of a ‘good seaman’, but recognizes 
technical competence, efficiency, and due diligence as embedded in both historical and contemporary 
context. Good Seamanship is a strong indication of a quality standard pertaining to safety that is a 
norm with outstanding discursive power.  
Challenges at the third order of governance are also manifested through multiple mindsets represented 
in global shipping. For instance, growth and efficiency as socio-economic values pertain to the free-
market (shareholder) capitalism mindset, whereas safety, environmental care and corporate 
responsibility are attuned to a normative stakeholder approach. Quality shipping standards inevitably 
function within these underlying tensions and arguably hold potential to softening them. An 
illustration can be derived from adoption of quality as a corporate strategy in the framework of a 
triple-bottom-line approach to value creation (Lai et al., 2011). Studies of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) practices in the shipping sector discovered differences between container 
shipping that had been an earlier adopter of CSR and other maritime logistic sectors (Pawlik et al., 
2012; Paulsen et al., 2016). These differences are attributed to the structure of inter-organizational 
relations and container segment market orientation to final consumers (business-to-consumers, or 
B2C) rather than other firms (business-to-business, or B2B). In container shipping more developed 
CSR practices were associated with B2C linkages realized through a shipping lines’ function of 
connecting global brands and their consumers, thus emphasizing the diversity in demand for quality 
shipping (Skovgaard, 2018). Yet, following the lead of container shipping, tanker and Ro-Ro sectors 
started engaging into CSR. Such examples of transfer of practices related to quality standardization 
from one domain of operations to another highlight the role of quality standards as governance 
images. 
4.4 Coordination through quality standards in shipping 
We argue that quality standards can be essential to polycentric governance as they function at three 
orders of governance and bring them into an interaction. A process of organization of different 
shipping actors and activities enabling them to manage interdependencies revolves around quality 
standards because they allow for (1) multiplicity of standard setting authority, (2) redundancy in 
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standard-setting and enforcement, and (3) negotiation amongst standard users and between standard 
setters and users. The existence of autonomous decision-makers pursuing their quality goals 
independently of each other draws upon the overarching legal framework provided by the 
international maritime law that is maintained though the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
that plays an important orchestrating role. These features distinctive of polycentric governance 
systems need to be upheld to create a system of internal references that facilitates conflict resolution 
without any central organizationally-driven mechanism.  
First, quality standards have proven to be effective in enhancing regulatory competition by 
introducing new sources of authority (Reinecker et al., 2012). The legitimacy of standards is rooted 
in the expertise of the standard-setter and not in formal authority, thus (at least in theory) any actor 
that can convince others in the usefulness of their standard can become a de facto regulator. Furger 
(1997) suggests there are examples in the maritime sector of what he terms “accountability” and self-
governance standards which with time transferred from voluntary to mandatory measures. For 
instance, trade associations, such as Chambers of Shipping, Port Associations, the American 
Petroleum Institute, and the American Institute of Shipping established voluntary codes of practice, 
which further influenced the international maritime conventions adopted by the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO). Integrative functioning of quality standards implies crossing the 
boundaries between public and private authority, creating hybrid for a needed to keep up with 
technological (e.g., automatic identification system) and professional (e.g., watchkeeping practices) 
development and update quality standards accordingly.  
Secondly, standards provide redundancy as they enable multiple enforcement mechanisms. Scholars 
have found that quality standards do not converge, so that several competing arrangements function 
simultaneously (Fransen, 2011). On the one hand, the idea of overlapping standards as a productive 
feature in transnational governance is counter-intuitive – standards are a tool for unification of 
practices and norms, also called standardization. On the other hand, such a ‘standards market’ 
(Reinecke et al., 2012) has various positive effects, including regulatory competition (whose standard 
is most comprehensive), social learning (what constitutes a comprehensive standard), and 
development of a common vocabulary. Through de-coupling of standard-setting and enforcement, 
multiple standards can be monitored by the same authority, and multiple authorities (certifiers) can 
monitor the same standard, which leads to competition between the certifiers, too. In shipping, such 
de-coupling is used in classification, a system of verifying that a ship complies with certain standards. 
Classification societies, whose goal is to ensure compliance with class rules, currently occupy a 
unique position as non-governmental standard-setting bodies as regards design, construction and 
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maintenance of vessels. Different classification societies have different standards, which enhances 
regulatory competition (the first mechanism). The major international maritime conventions (Load 
Line Convention, SOLAS, ISM Code) hold that a ship built according to the rules of a recognized 
classification society has sufficient strength of the hull, reliable machinery and vital systems, thus 
these conventions do not have such provisions. As a result, core part of safety and recently 
environmental standard setting and surveillance is delegated to these independent non-governmental 
organizations. Yet, when it comes to audit, another institution – port State control – conducts 
inspections to verify compliance with mandatory public regulations and classification standards. 
Finally, quality standards are negotiated both within and between the levels of governance. 
Normalizing function of quality standards involves a process of negotiation of an agreement on what 
is quality, that is criteria of which features and processes are considered qualified, enabled through a 
shared vocabulary. Hence, standards can facilitate knowledge production and sharing within 
networks and on a peer-to-peer basis, increase interdependency between actors through overlapping 
membership in standardization schemes, and create nested relationships through third party audit 
(Eberlein et al., 2014). In addition to these direct forms of coordination, quality standards can perform 
the functions of informal norms described by Tarko (2014) as they provide a common cognitive 
framing of problems and goals (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005). These common framings inform practices 
and procedures which create objective references for the process of quality management within the 
first governance order. Environmental quality standards help actors learn from more than one 
jurisdiction at a time, take away a multiplicity of lessons, and adapt new policies in a flexible way 
(Stone, 2007). By negotiating standards, actors are not only learning about the best practices for 
instance, in ballast water treatment technology, but also the ideas and informal practices of ballast 
water management across different flag administrations and industry pioneers (Rak et al., 2018).   The 
three mechanisms – regulatory competition, enforcement redundancy, and (re-)negotiation – place 
standards into a position of coordinating across jurisdictions and different levels of decision-making 
in deterritorialized shipping industry.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that quality standards, broadly defined as quality requirements applied 
to products and processes, represent a mechanism that facilitates coordination between 
geographically and organizationally diverse economic actors in domains characterized by multiple 
intra-sectoral linkages. While scholars of transnational business governance and global value chains 
paid attention to quality standards, they did not systematize the functioning of quality standards across 
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the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ dimensions of transnational governance systems. In this paper, we 
invoked the notion of polycentric governance as a framework incorporating both horizontal and 
vertical dimensions to bring together insights from various strands of theorizing on quality standards. 
We argued that three functions – regulative, integrative and normalizing – associated with quality 
standards are crucial to understand coordination in polycentric shipping governance. 
 
The functioning of quality standards can be analysed along three governance orders, each 
corresponding to a distinct functional dimension. First, quality standards developed and implemented 
to enhance quality management of certain socio-technical units are tangible action guidelines at the 
first level of governance where operational choices are made. The analysis has shown that even 
standards that are not followed by everyone provide practical examples of how quality management 
could be organized, hence raising awareness in shipping sub-sectors. The second dimension in which 
quality standards are paramount is institutionalized policy-making. The capacity of quality standards 
to cut across public/private divide and integrate fragmented authority is crucial to coordination at the 
second order of governance. Finally, development of a common understanding and learning have 
been presented as the third possible function of quality standards. The analysis suggests that shaping 
of a common vocabulary with regard to quality shipping is an ongoing learning processes that 
materializes not only within standard-setting organizations, but among broader stakeholders and on 
board ships. These three interrelated functions contribute to the emergence of coordination 
mechanisms that maintain the specific setup of polycentric governance. Regulatory competition, 
redundant enforcement, and mutual adjustment through negotiation place quality standards, rather 
than any specific organization, into the center of coordination process. 
 
From a more practical point of view, our analysis calls for re-assessment of the role quality standards 
play in transnational environmental governance of shipping, setting limitations to what standards can 
actually deliver. Counter to the arguments favoring the regulatory use of standards, we recognize the 
inherent limitations of standards as voluntary requirements, and argue that the main value of quality 
standards is informative, integrative, and discursive. Quality standards are required practices, rather 
than a description of what is actually practiced, but these requirements, unlike those postulated in the 
international legal agreements, reflect collective intentions in the value chains (or their parts). Quality 
standards have substance that is neither abstract nor subjective due to the constant ongoing 
negotiation across levels and scales of governance. The ideational underpinnings of coordination in 
polycentric governance previously demonstrated in research on science not only apply to 
transnational environmental governance of shipping, but open up space for action. Engaging wider 
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stakeholders into ideation around quality standards has a potential to enhance the alignment with 
goals of individual ship-owners and operators. 
The conceptual model developed here has a structural element that allows capturing the relationships 
between the orders of governance and processual elements that highlight ‘horizontal’ effects of 
quality standardization within each order. Yet, this is only a first step towards a systematic analysis 
of coordination in polycentric non-resource governance. Future research is therefore needed, tackling 
different cases and engaging in comparative studies of framing, storing, and sharing visions of desired 
outcomes in the process of standardization. From our point of view, questions could also focus on 
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Table 1: Typologies of standards. 
Brunsson et al., 2012 content Product standards Establish characteristics of 
a product, thereby 
allowing us to 
differentiate, for instance, 
organic from conventional 
agricultural produce 
  Process standards Regulate process within 
and between organization, 
and they may or may not 
link the process to the 
outcomes 
Gilbert et al. 2011 content Principle-based standards General frameworks for 




  certification standards Involve certification, 
verification and 
monitoring of production 
facilities against 
predefined criteria 
  reporting standards Define indicators and 
guidelines that can be used 
to produce standardized – 
and thus comparable – 
reporting on specific issues  
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  process standards Focus on the question of 
how a product or service is 
produced or delivered. 
Brunsson et al., 2012, 
Reinicke et al., 2012 
orientation Technical standards Requirements applied to 
technical systems, that, 
among other things, 
specify components and 
their relations in a certain 
appliance, define a 
measurement or planning 
procedure, ensure 
compatibility of different 
notation systems. 
  non-technical standards Socially-oriented non-
technical standards, such 
as standards for ethics, 
fairness or corporate 
responsibility, have an 
important political and 
normative dimension in a 
sense that their existence 
may be justified in terms 
of public policy objectives. 
Kerwer, 2005 addressee Common use standards Such as shoe sizes, are 
made on a “to whom it 
may concern” basis, 
meaning that they are for 
common use and any party 
that perceives a standard to 
be useful can adopt it. 
  Club standards Developed within 
organizations, for instance, 
industry associations, for 
their own use and are 
compulsory for the club 
members, i.a. define the 
club membership. 
  Public standards Designed for public sector 
and usually appear in a 
form of ‘best practice’, 
such as good governance 
standards promulgated by 
the World Bank 
Henson and Humprey, 
2012 
scope Public mandatory 
standards 
Essentially regulation 
  public voluntary standards  Created by public bodies 
but are not obligatory 
  private voluntary 
standards 
Created and adopted by 
private bodies 
  private mandatory 
standards 
Developed by the private 
bodies, but later legally 
mandated by the 
government 
Brunsson et al. 2012 standard-setting and their 
adoption 
de jure Outcome of a deliberate 
decision-making process, 
for instance, through the 
work of the International 
Standardization 




  de facto Emerge gradually from a 
non-regulated process of 
convergence towards the 
same practice (they use the 
QWERTY typewriter 
layout as an example) 
Hatto, 2001 standard-setting body formal standards Developed by a specialized 
national (e.g., British 
Standard), regional, or 
international body (ISO) 
  informal standards Developed by associations 
(e.g., IEEE - Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers, SAE Society of 
Automotive Engineers), 
industry groups, NGOs 
and the like 
Kerwer, 2005, Demortain, 
2008. 
standardizing arenas Private standardization Independently produced by 
a private actor is absorbed 
by the other private actors, 
with no cooperation 
between standard setters 
and users. 
  Committee standardization Set by transnational 
government networks 
aiming at “coordinating 
international standard 
setting and (predominantly 
national public) 
enforcement” (p. 625). 
  Standardization networks Joint effort between public 
and private actors under 
the supervision of 
transnational committees 
that take into account 
standard setting and 
enforcement. 
  standardization within 
organizations 
Led by states, members 
negotiate standards in an 
international forum and 
implements them at the 
national level. 
  standardization by 
scientists 
Forum to produce concepts 
that include both formal 
standards setters and 
potential users 
Authors based on Brunsson et al., 2012, Demortain, 2008, Gilbert et al. 2011, Hatto, 2001, Henson and Humprey, 2012, 
Kerwer, 2005, Reinicke et al., 2012. 
 
Table 2: Basic features of polycentricity: a comparative overview. 
Vincent Ostrom (Ostrom et al) Bloomington School (McGinnis 
and Elinor Ostrom) 
Aligica and Tarko 
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(1) many autonomous units formally 
independent of one another,  
(2) choosing to act in ways that take 
account of others 
(3) interacting through process of 
cooperation, competition, conflict, 
and conflict resolution. 
(1) freedom to enter/exit;  
(2) legitimate exercise of coercive 
capabilities;  
(3) overarching system of rules; 
(4)existence of constitutional rules 
(rules on how to change rules); 
(5) incentives alignment. 
(1) multiplicity of decision centers 
(“active exercise of different 
opinions”); 
(2) institutional and cultural 
framework that provides the 
overarching system of rules defining 
the polycentric system; 
(3) spontaneous order generated by 
evolutionary competition between the 
different decision centers’ ideas, 
methods, ways of doing things. 
Authors based on V. Ostrom (1991), McGinnis and Ostrom (2012), Aligica and Tarko (2012). 
 
Table 3: Quality standards in polycentric governance. 
Governance order IAD choice type Standards as … Function 
first operational action guidelines, practical 
rules 
material/regulative 
second policy collective intentions institutional/integrative 
third (meta) constitutional image, value, aspiration cognitive/discursive 
Authors based on Kooiman and Jentoft (2009), Ostrom (2005), Pattberg (2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
